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Abstract
We study revenue optimization pricing algorithms for repeated posted-price auctions where a
seller interacts with a single strategic buyer that holds a fixed private valuation. We show that,
in the case when both the seller and the buyer have the same discounting in their cumulative
utilities (revenue and surplus), there exist two optimal algorithms. The first one constantly offers
the Myerson price, while the second pricing proposes a “big deal": pay for all goods in advance
(at the first round) or get nothing. However, when there is an imbalance between the seller and
the buyer in the patience to wait for utility, we find that the constant pricing, surprisingly, is no
longer optimal. First, it is outperformed by the pricing algorithm “big deal", when the seller’s
discount rate is lower than the one of the buyer. Second, in the inverse case of a less patient
buyer, we reduce the problem of finding an optimal algorithm to a multidimensional optimization
problem (a multivariate analogue of the functional used to determine Myerson’s price) that
does not admit a closed form solution in general, but can be solved by numerical optimization
techniques (e.g., gradient ones). We provide extensive analysis of numerically found optimal
algorithms to demonstrate that they are non-trivial, may be non-consistent, and generate larger
expected revenue than the constant pricing with the Myerson price.
1 Introduction
Revenue maximization in online advertising is an important development direction of leading Internet
companies (like real-time ad exchanges [6], search engines [19], and social networks), in which a
large part of ad inventory is sold via widely applicable second price auctions [19, 32], including the
generalizations GSP [41] and VCG [35]. The optimization of revenue in these auctions is mostly
controlled by means of reserve prices, whose proper setting is studied both by game-theoretical
methods [35, 28] and by machine learning approaches [36, 8, 41, 32, 31, 15]. A large number of
online auctions in, for example, ad exchanges involve only a single buyer [2, 33, 3, 15], and, in this
case, a second-price auction with reserve reduces to a posted-price auction [26] where the seller sets
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a reserve price for a good (e.g., an advertisement space) and the buyer decides whether to accept or
reject it (i.e., to bid above or below the price).
In our study, we focus on a scenario in which the seller repeatedly interacts through a posted-price
mechanism with the same strategic buyer that holds a fixed private valuation for a good and seeks
to maximize his cumulative surplus. At each round of this game, the seller is able to chose the
price based on previous decisions of the buyer: he applies a deterministic online learning algorithm
announced to the buyer in advance [33]. While previous studies on this scenario [2, 33, 15] provide
the seller with pricing algorithms that guarantee lower bounds on his cumulative revenue for any
buyer valuation (via worst-case strategic regret minimization), we search for pricing algorithms that
exactly maximize the expectation of the seller’s cumulative revenue over a given distribution of buyer
valuations. The cumulative utilities (surplus for the buyer and revenue for the seller) are considered
as discounted sums of corresponding instant utilities gained at each round, what allows us to cover a
wide range of games (including the ones with infinite number of rounds and finite games without
discounting).
We start our study from addressing the case when both the seller and the buyer have the same
discount. We show that the constant pricing algorithm with the Myerson price p∗ = argmaxpHD(p),
where HD(p) = p · PV∼D[V ≥ p] and D is the valuation distribution, maximizes our optimization
objective (see Theorem 1). This result tells us that any dynamic learning of prices based on previous
decisions of the buyer can not increase the expected cumulative revenue of the seller with respect to
a much simpler approach that offers the optimal constant price over all rounds. Further we also show
that the above mentioned optimal pricing is not unique. Namely, there exists an optimal pricing
algorithm (referred to as “big deal") that proposes the following choice to the buyer: pay a large
price at the first round and get all goods in the subsequent rounds for free, otherwise get nothing
(see Prop. 1). The same discount for both participants of the game assumes that we do not give any
advantage to each of them over the other one. However, in many real applications, there exists an
imbalance between the sides in the patience to wait for utility. This asymmetry is often modeled by
different discounts for them [2, 3, 33]. In our work, we address both the case of less patient seller
and the case of less patient buyer.
First, in the case when the buyer’s discount rate is larger than the seller’s one, we find that the
algorithm “big deal" with a specific price at the first round can still be effectively applied by the
seller (i.e., with optimal outcome). Namely, it allows the seller to “accumulate" all his revenue at
the first round and, in this way, to avoid the uncomfortable discounting in the future rounds; this
discount makes the constant algorithm with Myerson’s price suboptimal (see Sec. 5). Second, in the
inverse case, when the buyer’s discount rate is lower than the seller’s one, the optimization problem
becomes surprisingly more complicated. In this case, we reduce it to the optimization of a bilinear
form in v = {vj}j and {PV∼D[V ≥ vi]}j (see Theorem 2). This functional constitutes a multivariate
analogue of the one-dimensional function HD(p) widely used in static auctions to find the optimal
pricing. Our reduction does not admit a closed form solution in general, but allows to find the
optimal algorithm by means of state-of-the-art numerical optimization techniques (e.g., gradient
ones). In contrast to the previous cases, the optimal algorithm in this case of less patient buyer
is non-trivial and its prices depend on both the valuation distribution and the discounts. Finally,
we numerically solve the above mentioned reduced problem for a series of representative discounts
and analyze properties of the obtained optimal algorithms (see Sec. 6). In this way, we show, in
particular, that an optimal algorithm may be non-consistent1 and provides revenue larger than the
constant algorithm with Myerson’s price.
1A consistent algorithm never sets prices lower (higher) than earlier accepted (rejected, resp.) ones.
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The most important conclusion consists in the following. Only in the case of equal discounts,
the seller cannot advantageously use the ability to change prices in dynamic fashion (i.e., to learn
them) w.r.t. the static approach. But, both in the case when the seller is far more ready to wait for
revenue than the buyer, and, more surprisingly, in the inverse case, the seller can boost his revenue
w.r.t. the one obtained by the optimal constant algorithm. Overall, the above described thorough
study of optimal pricing algorithms for repeated auctions with different discounts constitutes the
main contribution of our work. The ideas behind our techniques of theoretical analysis are simple
and, to the best of our knowledge, novel; they might thus be used for future foundations of repeated
auctions, e.g., the ones with multiple buyers.
2 Preliminaries, problem statement and related work
2.1 Setup of repeated posted-price auctions
We consider the following standard mechanism of repeated posted-price auctions [2, 33, 10, 15, 16].
The seller repeatedly proposes goods (e.g., advertisement spaces) to a single buyer over a sequence
of rounds (one good per round). The buyer holds a fixed private valuation v ∈ [0; +∞) for a good,
i.e., the valuation v is unknown to the seller and is equal for goods offered in all rounds. At each
round t ∈ N, the seller offers a price pt for a good, and the buyer makes his allocation decision
at ∈ {0, 1}: to buy the currently offered good (at = 1), or not (at = 0). In our setting, the seller’s
price pt, t ∈ N, depends on the previous answers a1, .., at−1 of the buyer (a.k.a. the history up to the
round t), i.e., the seller uses a pricing algorithm A to set prices in the deterministic online learning
manner [2, 33, 15]. The sequence of the buyer’s answers is denoted by a = {at}∞t=1 and is referred to
as a buyer strategy.
Hence, given an algorithm A and a strategy a, the price sequence {pt}∞t=1 is uniquely determined.
The instant surplus at(v − pt) and the instant revenue atpt are thus gained by the buyer and the
seller, respectively, at each round t ∈ N. An instant surplus (or revenue) obtained in different rounds
may contribute differently to the total (cumulative) profit of the buyer (or the seller, respectively).
We model this by discount factors γBt and γSt at each round t ∈ N and get the total discounted surplus
and the total discounted revenue of the following form:
SurγB(A, v,a) :=
∞∑
t=1
γBt at(v − pt) and RevγS(A,a) :=
∞∑
t=1
γSt atpt, respectively. (1)
We assume that the discount sequences γB = {γBt }∞t=1 and γS = {γSt }∞t=1 are non-negative, γBt , γSt ≥ 0,
∀t ∈ N, and the series converges, ΓB:=∑∞t=1 γBt ,ΓS:=∑∞t=1 γSt <∞. We also assume that there are no
zeros between positive numbers in the sequences γB and γS. Note that discounts allow us to consider
a general setting, which covers a wide range of cases including finite games without discounting (i.e.,
γBt = γ
S
t = I{t≤T}2 for some horizon T ∈ N) and infinite games with discount rates that decrease
geometrically (i.e., γBt = γSt = γt−1 for some γ ∈ (0, 1)) [2].
Both the seller and the buyer may have the same discount (γBt = γSt ), which is a reasonable
assumption since it does not give any privilege to each party over the other one. For instance, money
inflation, a common interpretation of the discount factor, affects the preferences of both participants
for current gains versus future ones equally. The case when the discounts are different (γBt 6= γSt ) is
important for real applications as well [2]. The discounting can also be considered as a model for
uncertainty of the participants about the total number of rounds of their interaction (i.e., the factor
γt is a priori probability that repeated auctions will last exactly t rounds).
2IB denotes the indicator of the condition B, i.e., IB = 1, when B holds, and 0, otherwise.
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Following a standard assumption in mechanism design, which matches the practice in ad
exchanges [33], the pricing algorithmA, used by the seller, is announced to the buyer in advance [2, 15].
In this case, the buyer is able to act strategically against this algorithm, i.e., to chose the optimal
strategy aOpt(A, v,γB) in the set of all possible strategies S := {0, 1}N, i.e., aOpt(A, v,γB) =
argmaxa∈S SurγB(A, v,a)3, This leads us to the definition of the strategic revenue of the pricing
algorithm A, which faces the strategic buyer with a valuation v ∈ [0,∞):
SRevγS,γB(A, v) := RevγS(A,aOpt(A, v,γB)). (2)
2.2 Notation and auxiliary definitions
Following [26, 33, 15], we associate a deterministic pricing algorithm with a complete infinite binary
tree T in which each vertex is labeled with a price. The algorithm offers the price from a current
node (starting from the root) and moves to the left (right) child of the node if the buyer answers
at = 0 (= 1, respectively). Clearly, buyer decisions at rounds 1, .., t encode bijectively paths from
the root to tree nodes and, thus, nodes as well. Hence, we apply short notations for the nodes
by means of the dictionary of finite strings N := {0, 1}∗: the root is the empty string e, its left
child is 0, the right one is 1, the right child of 0 is 01, etc. (e.g., 0k denotes the string of k zeros).
Similarly, we denote buyer strategies by infinite strings from the alphabet {0, 1}4 to save space (e.g.,
the buyer that follows 10∞ accepts the price at the first round, a1 = 1, and rejects all remaining
ones, at = 0, t > 1). Overall, the set of pricing algorithms A is equivalent to the set of mappings
from the nodes N to [0; +∞), and we use thus them interchangeably: A = [0; +∞)N. The price of
an algorithm A ∈ A offered at a node n ∈ N is denoted by A(n).
2.3 Problem statement
Let possible buyer valuations be distributed on [0,+∞) according to some distribution D, i.e., the
buyer valuation v (fixed over all rounds) is a realization of a random variable V ∼ D. Following a
standard assumption in classical auction theory [36, 28], the valuation distribution D is known by
the seller. We also assume that the distribution D has finite expectation, i.e., EV∼D[V ] <∞, and
is continuous; these assumptions are standard in auction theory as well [35, 28]. So, we consider
the problem of finding a pricing algorithm A∗ ∈ A that maximizes the expected strategic revenue5:
EV∼D[SRevγS,γB(A, V )]→ max.
From a game-theoretic view, we consider a two-player non-zero sum repeated game with incomplete
information and unlimited supply in which the seller commits to the pricing (since he announces
the algorithm before the auctions take place). An attentive reader may also note that, due to the
commitment and the presence of only one buyer, our setting can be formalized as a two stage game.
The common knowledge here are the discounts γB, γS, and the prior distribution D of the private
valuation V , while the realization v of V is known only by the buyer. At the first stage, the seller
picks a pricing algorithm A ∈ A, his choice is announced to the buyer; at the second stage, the
buyer picks a buyer strategy a ∈ S. The buyer’s utility is the surplus and the seller’s one is the
3We show existence of the maximum in Appendix A.1. If there is a tie, i.e., more than one optimal strategy, the
buyer selects one of them arbitrary (as in [35, 28]).
4We purposely use different outline of the numbers zero and one to distinguish their use in numerical expressions
(as 0, 1) and their use in strings that encode nodes or strategies (as elements of the alphabet {0, 1}).
5Note that, in repeated auctions, revenue is usually compared to the one that would have been earned by
offering the buyer’s valuation v if it was known in advance to the seller, resulting in the notion of the strategic regret
SRegγS,γB(A, v) := ΓSv−SRevγS,γB(A, v). Regret is a powerful instrument to obtain lower bounds on revenue [26, 2, 15],
but, in our setup, minimization of the expected strategic regret is equivalent to our problem.
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expected revenue (see Eq. (1)). Thus, if some pricing A∗ ∈ A is a solution to our problem, then the
pair (A∗,aOpt(A∗, v,γB)) will be an equilibrium of above described game.
Remark 1. Note that both an optimal buyer strategy and an optimal algorithm will remain optimal,
if the discount γB or γS is multiplied by any positive constant. Hence, from here on in our paper we
assume w.l.o.g. that γB1 = 1 and γS1 = 1.
2.4 Related work
Optimization of seller revenue in auctions was generally reduced to a selection of proper reserve
prices for buyers6 (e.g., in VCG [35], GSP [41], and other auctions [37]). In such setups, these prices
usually depend on distributions of buyer bids or valuations [35] and was in turn estimated by machine
learning techniques [19, 41, 37], while alternative approaches learned reserve prices directly [32, 31].
In contrast to these works, we consider an online deterministic learning framework for repeated
auctions.
Revenue optimization for repeated auctions was mainly concentrated on algorithmic reserve prices,
that are updated in online fashion over time, and was also known as dynamic pricing, see the extensive
survey [13] on this field. Oh the one hand, dynamic pricing was studied under game-theoretic view
in context of different aspects such as budget constraints [6, 5], mean field equilibria [23, 6], strategic
buyer behavior [11, 29], multi-period contracts [7], etc. A series of studies [40, 14, 22] close to ours
considered repeated sales where the seller does not commit for its pricing policy (in contrast to our
setting), what required thus special approaches (such as the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium)
to address the revenue optimization problem. That studies showed that the seller earns less in settings
without commitment than with it. Another line of works like [38, 24] studied auction environment
settings of a general form and was aimed to find revenue optimal mechanisms that are incentive
compatible (truthful). In contrast to these studies, we consider a specific mechanism of repeated
posted-price auctions and do not require its truthfulness (e.g., the algorithms in Sec. 6.2 and 6.3).
Finally, our work can be considered as further development of classical auction theory [36, 28]: in
particular, in the case of a more patient seller, to address the optimal pricing problem we derive a
multidimensional optimization functional, defined in Eq. (12), which is a multivariate analogue of
the classical one, p · PV∼D[V ≥ p], used to determine the optimal reserve price in static auctions.
Overall, the optimal pricing in our scenario of repeated posted-price auctions with different discounts
for the seller and the buyer, to the best of our knowledge, was never considered in existing studies,
and we believe that the key ideas behind our analysis may be used for future foundation on repeated
auctions.
Oh the other hand, revenue optimization in dynamic pricing was considered from algorithmic
and learning approaches: as bandit problems [1, 43, 30] (e.g., UCB-like pricing [4], bandit feedback
models [42]); from the buyer side (valuation learning [23, 42], competition between buyers and
optimal bidding [21, 42], interaction with several sellers [20], etc.); from the seller side against several
buyers [8, 25, 39, 17]; and a single buyer with stochastic valuation (myopic [26, 9] and strategic
buyers [2, 3, 33, 10], feature-based pricing [3, 12], limited supply [4]).
The most relevant studies from these works on online learning are [2, 33, 15, 16], where our
scenario of the strategic buyer with a fixed private valuation is considered. Amin et al. [2] proposed
to seek for algorithms that have the lowest possible upper bound on the strategic regret for the worst
case buyer valuation, i.e., supv∈[0,1][SRegγS,γB(A, v,a)] ≤ O(f(T )), where T is the finite game horizon.
6Of course, there are other options to optimize revenue like quality scores for advertisements in ad auctions [19],
but they are significantly less popular. And, surely, revenue optimization was also considered in other contexts such
as trade-offs between auction stakeholders [18] or between auction properties (e.g., simplicity, expressivity [34], and
revenue monotonicity [18]).
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This problem was recently solved in [15], where the algorithm PRRFES with a tight regret bound in
Θ(log log T ) was proposed. Some extensions of this algorithm were proposed in [16]. In contrast to
these studies, first, we search for a pricing algorithm that maximizes the strategic revenue expected
over buyer valuations, i.e., Ev[SRevγS,γB(A, v)], (equivalently, s.t. Ev[SRegγS,γB(A, v)]→ min), which
matches the practice of ad exchanges and optimization goals in classical auction theory [28]. Second,
our revenue optimization problem is solved exactly (not approximately and not via optimization of
lower/upper bounds). Third, our study considers a more general setup in which not only the buyer’s
surplus is discounted over rounds, but also the seller’s revenue does.
3 Constant pricing algorithms
We start investigation of the problem from study of constant algorithms, i.e., such algorithms that
propose only one price over all rounds independently of the buyer’s decisions.
Definition 1. A pricing algorithm A is said to be constant, if there exists a price p ∈ [0; +∞) s.t.,
at each node n ∈ N, the algorithm’s price A(n) equals p. This price p is referred to as the algorithm
price and is denoted by p(A). The set of all constant algorithms is denoted by A0 ⊂ A.
Note that since a constant algorithm A ∈ A0 offers a price p = p(A) that is independent of
buyer decisions, the buyer has no incentive to lie and behaves thus truthfully. Hence, the buyer
either rejects the price all the rounds, or accepts it (in our notations, applies the strategy 0∞ or 1∞,
resp.) depending on whether his valuation v is lower than p or not. Since RevγS(A, 0∞) = 0 and
RevγS(A, 1∞) = p
∑∞
t=1 γ
S
t , the expectation of the strategic revenue of the constant algorithm A is
EV∼D
[
SRevγS,γB(A, V )
]
= P[V < p] · RevγS(A, 0∞) + P[V ≥ p] · RevγS(A, 1∞) = P[V ≥ p] · p · ΓS.
It is easy to see that a constant algorithm A is optimal if its price p(A) is the global maximum
point of the function HD(p) := P[V ≥ p] · p, which is well known in the theory of non-repeated
auctions [35, 36, 28]. The existence of a global maximum point of HD(p) for our distribution D is
shown in Appendix A.2, and we refer to the leftmost one of them as the Myerson price p∗(D) [35].
Note that this price can be find via the first-order necessary condition p = (1− FD(p))/fD(p), when
the distribution D has continuous probability density fD (FD is its cumulative distribution function).
Definition 2. The constant algorithm A ∈ A0 with the price p(A) equal to the Myerson price p∗(D)
of the distribution D is called the optimal constant algorithm and is denoted by A∗D.
4 Equal discounts of the seller and the buyer
In this section, we study the case when the seller and the buyer discount their utilities equally, i.e.,
γ := γS = γB, and we use the following notation for the strategic revenue: SRevγ := SRevγ,γ . First
of all, we summarize some useful properties of surplus and revenue as functions of the valuation v.
Remark 2. Let a pricing algorithm A ∈ A and the discount sequence γ be given. For simplicity,
we will use the following short notations of surpluses as mappings from the valuation domain:
Sa(v) := Surγ(A, v,a) and S(v) := Surγ(A, v,aOpt(A, v,γ)), for which the following hold:
1. for each strategy a ∈ S, the surplus Sa w.r.t. this strategy is a linear function of v of the form
Sa(v) = qav − ra, where qa =
∑∞
t=1 γtat is the discounted quantity of purchased goods and ra
is the discounted revenue of the seller (i.e., ra = Revγ(A,a));
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2. the strategic (optimal) surplus S is convex as a function of v, because it is the maximum of a
set of linear functions: S(v) = maxa∈S Sa(v) (by definition);
3. the strategic surplus S(v) is non-negative for any v ≥ 0 since, for the strategy a = 0∞, we
have Sa(v) = 0, which implies in turn that S(v) ≥ Sa(v) = 0, ∀v ≥ 0;
4. the derivative S′(v) exists for almost all v ∈ [0; +∞) (i.e., it does not exist on a set of Lebesgue
measure zero), because S(v) is convex and is thus absolutely continuous.
Lemma 1. For any pricing algorithm A ∈ A, the strategic revenue R(v) := SRevγ(A, v) is increasing
on the valuation domain [0; +∞), it starts from zero (i.e., R(0) = 0), and the random variable R(V )
has thus finite non-negative expectation (i.e., 0 ≤ E [R(V )] < +∞).
Proof. We prove only the first claim since the utilized technique will be useful further. The other
claims are quite simple and are deferred to Appendix A.3 due to space constraints. For any two
valuations v1 and v2 ∈ [0; +∞) s.t. v1 < v2, and two corresponding optimal strategies a1 and a2 ∈ S,
i.e., such that S(vj) = Saj (vj), j = 1, 2, (using the notations from Remark 2), we have
Sa1(v1) ≥ Sa2(v1) and Sa2(v2) ≥ Sa1(v2).
Therefore, since Saj , j = 1, 2, are linear, they either coincide (then ra1 = ra2), or have an intersection
point w in [v1, v2]⊂ [0; +∞). In the latter case, one gets Sa1(v)≥Sa2(v) ∀v ∈ [0, w], which implies
−ra1 ≥ −ra2 when v = 0. Hence, we obtain R(v2) = ra2 ≥ ra1 = R(v1) for any v2 > v1 ≥ 0.
Similarly to the optimal surplus function S(·) and the strategic revenue one R(·), we introduce
the strategic purchased quantity Q(·) as a map from the valuation domain, i.e., Q(v) := ∑∞t=1 γtaOt (v),
where {aOt (v)}∞t=1 = aOpt(A, v,γ). Note that S(v) = Q(v)v −R(v), for each v ∈ [0,+∞).
Lemma 2. Assume that, for a given v ≥ 0, the derivative S′(v) exists. Then, Q(v) is uniquely
defined and equals to S′(v) for any optimal strategy a of the buyer that holds the valuation v.
The proof of this lemma is simple and rather technical; it is also deferred to Appendix A.4 due to
space constraints. Lemma 2 together with the identity SRevγ(A, v)=R(v)=Q(v)v−S(v) gives us:
Corollary 1. For almost all v ∈ [0; +∞), the strategic revenue SRegγ(A, v) is uniquely defined for
any optimal strategy a of the buyer that holds the valuation v7.
Remark 3. Function Q(v) is defined almost everywhere and non-decreasing on its domain, since
Q′(v) = S′′(v), which also defined almost everywhere and not less than 0, since S is convex on its
domain8. Also by the definition Q(v) ≤ Γ and, thus, Q(+∞) is finite.
4.1 Optimality of the constant algorithm with the Myerson price
We use notations for the distribution functions: F (v) := P[V ≤ v] and G(v) := 1− F (v) = P[V > v].
Lemma 3. For the mappings S(v), R(v), and Q(v) the following identity holds:
E [R(V )] =
∫
[0;+∞)
G(v)Q(v)dv +
∫
[0;+∞)
G(v)vdQ(v)−
∫
[0;+∞)
G(v)dS(v).
7Remind that the strategic revenue may not be uniquely defined (see Footnote 3 near the definition of the strategic
revenue).
8Note that this fact can be proved directly like in Lemma 1.
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The proof is rather technical, relies on the properties of S, R, and Q established in the above
statements, and is thus deferred to Appendix A.5.
Theorem 1. Assume the valuation V ∼ D and the discount sequence γ = {γt}∞t=1 satisfy the
aforementioned conditions (see Sec. 2). Then the expected strategic revenue of an arbitrary pricing
algorithm A ∈ A is not greater than the one of the optimal constant algorithm A∗D:
∀A ∈ A we have E [SRevγ(A, V )] ≤ E [SRevγ(A∗D, V )] . (3)
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider an arbitrary algorithm A ∈ A and use the notations S, R, and Q
introduced above. From Lemma 3, we have
E [R(V )] =
∫
[0;+∞)
G(v)Q(v)dv +
∫
[0;+∞)
G(v)vdQ(v)−
∫
[0;+∞)
G(v)dS(v) =
∫
[0;+∞)
G(v)vdQ(v), (4)
where the latter identity of Eq. (4) holds due to the facts that S is absolutely continuous on its
domain (see Remark 2), thus,
∫
[0;+∞)G(v)dS(v) =
∫
[0;+∞)G(v)S
′(v)dv, and that S′(v) = Q(v)
almost everywhere (see Lemma 2). By definition, we have HD(v) = G(v)v, ∀v ≥ 0, and, hence,
Eq. (4) implies that E [R(V )] =
∫
[0;+∞)HD(v)dQ(v) can be upper bound by the expression
HD(p
∗(D)) ·
∫
[0;+∞)
1dQ(v) = HD(p
∗(D)) · (Q(+∞)−Q(0)) ≤ HD(p∗(D)) · Γ, (5)
where HD(v) is bounded by its maximum HD(p∗(D)), the first identity is due to the fact that Q is
non-decreasing on v, and non-negative Q(v) is bounded by Γ for all v ≥ 0 (see Remark 3). Finally,
remind that the expected strategic revenue E [SRevγ(A∗D, V )] of the optimal constant algorithm A∗D
equals to the right hand side of Eq. (5) (see Sec. 3).
Th. 1 states that the optimal constant algorithm A∗D is, in fact, optimal among all pricings A.
4.2 Non-uniqueness of the optimal algorithm: “big deal" pricing
It appears that the optimal constant algorithm A∗D is not the unique optimal one. We provide an
example of applying a general technique for building optimal algorithms of certain form.
Proposition 1. Let the game have at least 2 rounds (i.e., Γ > γ1). If an algorithm A1 sets the first
price p1 equal to Γp∗(D)/γ1 and sets all further prices either pt = 0, t ≥ 2, if the buyer accepts the
first offer, a1 = 1, or pt = 2γ1p1/(Γ− γ1), t ≥ 2, otherwise; then the algorithm A1 is optimal.
Proof. First, note that the buyer has no incentive to lie after the first round since the algorithm
prices pt, t ≥ 3, do not depend on his decisions at, t ≥ 2. Hence, possible candidates for optimal
strategies are 0∞, 1∞, 01∞, and 10∞. It easy to see that the optimal buyer strategy in response
to A1 is 1∞ for the case v > p∗(D) and 0∞ for v < p∗(D). Indeed, if the buyer accepts p1, further
offers are for free goods that will be accepted. If the buyer rejects p1, then, for any strategy a ∈ S
s.t. a1 = 0, we have
Sa(v) ≤ (Γ− γ1)(v − 2γ1p1/(Γ− γ1)) < Γv − 2γ1p1 < Γv − γ1p1 = S1∞(v). (6)
Thus, if S1∞(v) > 0 = S0∞(v), then 1∞ is optimal strategy, and, if S1∞(v) < 0, then Eq. (6)
implies optimality of 0∞. Finally, note that S1∞(v) = Γv − γ1p1 = Γ(v − p∗(D)) that implies
S1∞(v) > 0⇔ v > p∗(D). Hence, the expected strategic revenue of A1 is
E [SRevγ(A1, V )] = P[p∗(D) ≤ V ] · γ1Γp∗(D)/γ1 = HD(p∗(D))Γ = E [SRevγ(A∗D, V )] . (7)
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The key idea behind the algorithm A1 is quite simple. Roughly speaking, the seller “accumulates"
all his revenue at the first round by proposing the buyer a “big deal": to pay a large price at the first
round and get all goods in the subsequent rounds for free, or, otherwise, get nothing9. Note that this
optimal pricing algorithm depends both on the discounting γ and the valuation distribution D: the
price p1 is calculated based on the knowledge of the total discounted revenue Γp∗(D) that is earned
by A∗D from selling all goods. An attentive reader may note that the idea of the aforementioned
technique allows, in fact, to build more variants of optimal algorithms by “spreading" the revenue
Γp∗(D) in a certain way along the rightmost path of the tree T. In Sections 5 and 6, we show that
A1 may remain optimal in the cases when the constant algorithm A∗D is no longer optimal.
5 Less patient seller
Now we are ready to study the cases when the seller and the buyer discounts are different. Further,
we argue that the constant algorithm A∗D is no longer optimal among all algorithms A in these cases.
We start our investigation from a seller which is less patient than the buyer in willingness to wait
for the revenue. We consider the case when γS ≤ γB (i.e., γSt ≤ γBt ∀t ∈ N); e.g., when the discounts
decrease geometrically: γS = {γt−1S }∞t=1 and γB = {γt−1B }∞t=1, where 0 < γS ≤ γB < 1.
Lemma 4. Let A ∈ A, then the following upper bound for its expected strategic revenue holds:
E
[
SRevγS,γB(A, V )
] ≤ ΓB ·HD(p∗(D)) (8)
Proof. Let aOpt(A, v,γB) = {aOt }∞t=1, then, using the independence of aOpt on the seller’s discount, we
get SRevγS,γB(A, v) =
∑∞
t=1 γ
S
t a
O
t (v − pt) ≤
∑∞
t=1 γ
B
t a
O
t (v − pt) = SRevγB,γB(A, v) = SRevγB(A, v).
Finally, E
[
SRevγS,γB(A, V )
] ≤ E [SRevγB(A, V )] ≤ ΓB · HD(p∗(D)), where Theorem 1 is applied
with γ = γB to infer the latter inequality.
Proposition 2. Let γS and γB be the seller and the buyer discounts, respectively, s.t. γS ≤ γB.
Then the algorithm A1 from Proposition 1 with γ set to γB (i.e., with p1 = ΓBp∗(D)) is optimal in A.
Proof. Since the optimal strategy is independent of the seller’s discount, the beginning of the proof
is similar to the one of Prop. 1 up to Eq. (7), where the seller’s discount is used for the first time.
In our case of different discounts, the identity Eq. (7) on the expected strategic revenue will have
the form E
[
SRevγS,γB(A1, V )
]
= P[p∗(D) ≤ V ] · γS1ΓBp∗(D)/γB1 = HD(p∗(D))ΓB, where we used
γS1 = γ
B
1 = 1 (see Remark 1). We see that A1 achieves the upper bound of Lemma 4 and is thus
optimal.
The relative expected revenue of the optimal algorithm A1 w.r.t. the optimal constant one A∗D
is ΓB/ΓS which is > 1, when γS < γB; i.e., the optimal revenue is larger than the one obtained by
offering the Myerson price constantly (in contrast to the equal discount case). For instance, for
geometric discounts γS = {γt−1S }∞t=1 and γB = {γt−1B }∞t=1, this revenue improvement ratio ΓB/ΓS is
equal to (1− γS)/(1− γB) and goes to +∞ as γB → 1− for a fixed γS. Moreover, the algorithm A1
provides exactly the same expected revenue as if the seller played in the game with the same discount
as the buyer one γB. This result is quite surprising, because the dominance of the buyer’s discount
γB over the seller’s one γS suggests a hypothesis that the seller should earn lower than with γB (e.g.,
9A similar pricing was proposed by [24] for a class of mechanism environments with multiplicative separability and
zero production cost. Their mechanism charges an up-front payment (before rounds starts) and posts zero price each
round obtaining thus truthfulness. In contrast to that study, the “big deal" pricing posts a large price at the first
round (our setup does not allow an up-front payment) and is not truthful (since the price p1 = Γp∗(D)/γ1 is accepted
by the strategic buyer whose valuation v > p∗(D), not v > p1).
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see the revenue of A∗D). But the ability of the seller to apply the trick of “accumulation" of all his
revenue at the first round (see Sec. 4.2) allows him to get the payments for all goods discounted by
the buyer’s γB at the first round and to boost thus his revenue over the constant pricing.
6 Less patient buyer
In contrast to the previous cases, finding an optimal pricing here is much more difficult problem
since the technique used in Sec. 4 and 5 to upper bound the expected strategic revenue is no longer
applicable (because it relies on the condition γS ≤ γB). As we will see further, in the studied case,
the obtained optimal algorithms are not trivial and require derivation of a multivariate analogue of
the functional HD(·) to be found in a multidimensional space. We obtain this functional in Sec. 6.1
and use it to provide extensive analysis of optimal algorithms in Sec. 6.2 and 6.3.
Definition 3. For a discount sequence γ = {γt}∞t=1, we define the discount rate sequence ν(γ) :=
{νt(γ)}∞t=1 as the sequence of the ratios of consecutive components of γ: νt(γ) := γt+1/γt when
γt > 0, and νt(γ) := 0 when γt = 010.
Remark 4. Let γ1 = {γ1t }∞t=1 and γ2 = {γ2t }∞t=1 be some discounts sequences. Then, the condition
ν(γ2) ≥ ν(γ1) is equivalent to the one that the sequence {γ2t /γ1t }∞t=1 is non-decreasing (formally,
treating 0/0 as +∞). The proof of this statement straightforwardly follows from Definition 3.
From here on in this section we consider the discounts γS and γB such that ν(γS) ≥ ν(γB). This
condition means that the seller is more patient than the buyer locally at each round (see Remark 4).
In particularly, ν(γS) ≥ ν(γB) implies that γS ≥ γB, i.e., the seller is globally more patient than the
buyer as well, but the inverse implication is not true11. A typical example of the studied case is a
pair of geometric discounts: γS = {γt−1S }∞t=1 and γB = {γt−1B }∞t=1, where 0 < γB ≤ γS < 1.
Definition 4. Let γ be a discount sequence, then an algorithm A ∈ A is said to be completely
active for γ, if for any strategy a ∈ S there exists a valuation v ∈ [0; +∞) such that Sa(v) = S(v),
where S and Sa are defined in Remark 2, i.e., the surplus function Sa is tangent to the optimal
surplus function S. We denote the set of all completely active algorithms for γ by A˜(γ).
In the next subsection, we will obtain the central results of our study. We do it for the case of a
finite number of rounds, but, in Sec. 6.3, we show how to use these results to obtain approximately
optimal algorithms for the case of the infinite number of rounds.
6.1 Finite games: multivariate optimization functional
In this section, we consider the case of the game with a finite time horizon T ∈ N: in particular, in
this case, seller algorithms, buyer strategies, and all discounts (including γS,γB) are considered as
their T -length variants (they can be defined in a natural way similarly to their infinite analogues).
For simplicity of presentation, we assume that all discounts are positive (i.e., 6=0) in all T rounds.
10Recall that if γt = 0 then γt′ = 0 for any t′ ≥ t, i.e., γ has no zeros between positive components (see Sec. 2.1).
Hence, the discount rate sequence ν(γ) has no zeros between positive components as well.
11We believe that the studied case of ν(γS) ≥ ν(γB) covers a large variety of discount sequences (e.g., the geometric
ones) that describe a more patient seller. Nonetheless, the study of the case when γS ≥ γB and ν(γS) 6≥ ν(γB) is
interesting and is left for future work. A possible direction to study this case consists in our following insight: if the
buyer is locally more patient than the seller at some round t (i.e., νt(γS) < νt(γB)), then the trick similar to the one
used in the “big deal" algorithm can be applied at this round t to get an optimal algorithm.
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Definition 5. A discount sequence γ is said to be regular12, if γ ·a1 6= γ ·a2 for any pair of strategies
a1,a2 ∈ S, i.e., any buyer strategy a ∈ S results in a unique discounted quantity of purchased goods.
Here we used the short notation for the scalar product: a · b := ∑t atbt.
In the following important proposition we show that any algorithm can be transformed to a
completely active one for the discount γB with no loss in the expected strategic revenue.
Proposition 3. In a T -round game, let γS,γB be discounts s.t. ν(γB) ≤ ν(γS) and γB is a regular
one. Then, for any pricing algorithm A ∈ A, there exists a completely active algorithm A˜ ∈ A˜(γB)
s.t.
E
[
SRevγS,γB(A, V )
] ≤ E [SRevγS,γB(A˜, V )] . (9)
Proof. For a given algorithm and a given discount γS, we will use the notation ra := RevγS(A,a)
for any a ∈ S (similarly to Remark 2, but indicating explicitly the seller’s discount). The main idea
of the proof consists in the following technique. We will consider all strategies a s.t. Sa(v) < S(v)
∀v ∈ [0; +∞) (referred to as non-active), and, consequently, for each of them denoted by a, we apply
the following procedure of modifying the source algorithm A: define a transformation A′ that does
not change Sb for b ∈ S \ {a}, moves Sa to the left until it is tangent to S in some v ∈ [0; +∞),
decreases ra, and does not decrease rb for b ∈ S \ {a}. That will imply that the expected strategic
revenue of the transformed algorithm A′ is no lower than the one of the source algorithm A. In this
way, we will (one-by-one) make all strategies active.
Let us consider the set of all non-active strategies. If it is empty, then A ∈ A˜(γB) and Eq. (9) holds.
Otherwise, note that the “always-reject" strategy a = 0T is always active, since Sa(0) = 0 = S(0).
Hence, one can order all non-active strategies by “the last 1 index" t1(a) = max{t| at = 1}.
We take a non-active strategy a with the smallest t1(a), denoting t1 := t1(a) and the node
n := a1a2 . . . at1−1, and construct a new algorithm A′ based on the source one A in the following
way. Set A′ = A and transform the prices A′(n),A′(r(n)), . . . ,A′(lT−t1−1(r(n))) as follows:
1. decrease A′(n) until the function Sa is tangent to the function S in some v ∈ [0; +∞);
2. if t1 < T , increase A′(lj(r(n))) for j = 0, . . . , T − t1 − 1 in such a way that
γBt1 · A′(n) + γBt1+j+1 · A′(lj(r(n))) = const. (10)
Since we chosen a with the smallest t1(a) among non-active strategies the price A′(n) obtained
in the step 1 is non-negative (and, thus, this step is correct). Indeed, substitute the t1-th component
in a by 0 and denote the obtained strategy by b. Due to selection of a, the strategy b is active.
Therefore, assume A′(n) is decreased to 0, then the function Sa(v) becomes equal to Sb(v) + γBt1v by
the definition. Since Sb is tangent to S, the increase of its slope by γBt1 will result in intersection
with S. This means that Sa will be tangent to S before A′(n) reaches 0.
Now let us prove that the transformation A′ satisfies properties announced at the beginning of
the proof. Let b ∈ S \ {a}. The step 2 implies that the transformation does not change Sb. For a
strategy b that does not come through the node r(n), the revenue rb remains the same, since the
algorithm prices that contribute to rb are not altered. For b 6= a that comes through the node r(n),
let us prove that rb can only increase. Since b 6= a there is a round t = t1 + j + 1, j ≥ 0, where
bt = 1. Let j s.t. this t is the first round of acceptance after reaching the node r(n), and let us
denote the node where this acceptance take place by m := lj(r(n)). Therefore, one can write the fol-
lowing expression for the increment of rb: γSt1
(
A′(n)−A(n) + (γSt1+j+1/γSt1)
(A′(m)−A(m))) = =
12The reasons to introduce this class of discounts are discussed in Remark 6.
11
γSt1
(
−(γBt1+j+1/γBt1)
(A′(m)−A(m))+ (γSt1+j+1/γSt1)(A′(m)−A(m))) ≥ 0, where we used Eq. (10)
to obtain the first equation and used ν(γB) ≤ ν(γS) to obtain the last inequality. So, rb can only
increase for b ∈ S \ {a}.
Finally, since Sa becomes tangent to S, which is convex (see Remark 2), the function Sa either
equals to S exactly in one point v ∈ [0; +∞) or coincides with Sb for some b ∈ S\{a}. The latter case
is impossible since a function Sb have different slope for different strategy b, because of regularity of
γB. Therefore, the optimal strategy does not change for the buyer with any valuation v except the only
one s.t. Sa(v) = S(v), and the strategic revenue expectation is not affected by the decrease of ra (due
to continuity of the valuation distribution D). Thus, E
[
SRevγS,γB(A, V )
] ≤ E [SRevγS,γB(A′, V )]
and the number of non-active strategies of A′ is reduced by one w.r.t. A. After that, we repeatedly
apply the above described transformation to A′ until the resulted algorithm has no non-active
strategies. In this way, we get A˜ ∈ A˜ that satisfies Eq. (10).
An attentive reader may note that the the finiteness of the game is crucially used in the assumption
that any (non-active) strategy a has “the last 1 index" t1(a). It is certainly untrue for infinite
strategies since there are the ones that accept the offer infinite number of rounds. Therefore, we
consider the validity of the Prop. 3’s statement (or its analogue) for the infinite game as an open
research question that could be considered as a possible direction for future work.
Corollary 2. In a T -round game, let γS,γB be discounts s.t. ν(γB) ≤ ν(γS) and γB is a regular
one. If there exists an optimal pricing algorithm A∗ ∈ A, then there exists an optimal completely
active algorithm A˜∗ ∈ A˜(γB). Thus, maxA∈A E[SRevγS,γB(A, V )] = maxA˜∈A˜(γB) E[SRevγS,γB(A˜, V )].
This corollary can be easily obtained from the previous proposition and tells us that one
can search for an optimal pricing algorithm among the class of completely active ones A˜. Our
next goal is to show that this class of algorithms A˜ can be linearly parametrized by the set
∆k := {v = {vj}kj=1 ∈ Rk| 0 ≤ v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vk}, where k := k(T ) := 2T − 1. In order to do this, first
of all, we introduce several matrix and vector notations. First, from here on in our paper we fix an
order of nodes N = {n1, . . . , nk}13, and, given this, we represent an algorithm A ∈ A as the vector
of its prices A = (A(n1), . . . ,A(nk)); note we use the same notation both for the algorithm and its
vector representation, since the object type could be easily restored from the context where it is used.
We also introduce the map p : S × A → RT , where p(a,A) is the vector of consecutively offered
prices by the algorithm A ∈ A along the path a ∈ S.
Second, given a regular discount γ, we introduce the notion of γ-dependent natural order of the
buyer strategies S = {0, 1}T : a ≺γ b⇔ γB · a < γB ·b for any a,b ∈ S. The important property of
this order consists in that the slope of the γ-discounted surplus function Sa is lower than the one of
Sb when a ≺γ b. Using this order, we index the strategies: S = {a0, . . . ,ak}; note that the strategy
0T is always the first one a0, while the strategy 1T is the last one ak. Third, given another discount
γ ′, we introduce the payment vector r(γ ′,γ,A), whose j-th component is rj(γ ′,γ,A) := γ ′ ·p(aj ,A)
for j = 1, . . . , k (note that we exclude the zero payment corresponded to the zeroth strategy a0).
We treat all vectors as vector-columns in our matrix operations.
Finally, we introduce the following k × k matrices:
• JT is a two-diagonal matrix with 1 on the diagonal and −1 under the diagonal;
• ZT (γ) = diag(z1, . . . , zk), where with zj = (γ · aj − γ · aj−1)−1 for j = 1, . . . , k;
13E.g., a consistent order: the nodes from the left subtree come before the root node e, and the ones from the right
subtree come after the root e; then we recursively repeat this rule for the left and right subtrees.
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• KT (γ,γ ′) = ((κij))i,j=1,...,k, where κij = γ′tat if the path ai ∈ S passes through the node
nj ∈ N whose round is t14, and κ = 0, otherwise. Note that, by the definition, the i-th
component of the vector KT (γ,γ ′)A is equal to
∑T
t=1 γ
′
ta
i
tA(ai1 . . . ait−1).
Lemma 5. In a T -round game, let γ be a regular discount, the strategies S are naturally ordered by
γ (as above), while the matrix and vector notations are introduced as above, then the set of completely
active pricing algorithms A˜(γ) (i.e., their vector representations) can be linearly mapped onto ∆k(T )
by the matrix WT (γ) := ZT (γ)JTKT (γ,γ), which is correctly defined and is invertible.
Proof. First, by the definition of the matrix KT (γ,γ) and the vector A, we have that the payment
vector r(γ,γ,A) = KT (γ,γ)A. Second, let us denote the intersection point of the lines Saj and
Saj−1 by vj for j = 1, . . . , k and combine them in the vector v = (v1, . . . , vk). From the identities
γ · ajvj − rj(γ,γ,A) = Saj (vj) = Saj−1(vj) = γ · aj−1vj − rj(γ,γ,A), j = 1, . . . , k,
by simple arithmetic calculations, one can show that these intersection points can be expressed via
the payment vector in the following matrix form: v = ZT (γ)JT r(γ,γ,A). Combining with the
previous finding, we have that v = ZT (γ)JTKT (γ,γ)A. So, we obtain in this way the linear map
wγ(A) := WT (γ)A : A→ Rk that depends on γ.
The proof of the statement that wγ(A) ∈ ∆k(T ) if and only if A ∈ A˜(γ) could be made via two
inductions and is rather technical. Hence, it is deferred to Appendix A.6 due to space constraints.
The matrices ZT , JT , and KT are invertible15, thus, both the matrix WT and the map wγ : A→ Rk
are invertible as well. Hence, A˜(γ) is linearly mapped onto ∆k(T ) by wγ .
Proposition 4. In a T -round game, let γS be a discount, γB be a regular discount, the strategies
S are naturally ordered by γB (as above), while the matrix and vector notations are introduced as
above. Then there exists an invertible linear transformation wγB : A˜(γB)→ ∆k, k = k(T ) s.t., for
any completely active pricing algorithm A ∈ A˜(γB), its expected strategic revenue has the form
EV∼D
[
SRevγS,γB(A, V )
]
= LD,γS,γB(v) for v := w(A), (11)
where
LD,γS,γB(v) := (1− FD(v))ᵀΞT (γS,γB)v, v ∈ ∆k, (12)
ΞT (γ
S,γB) := JT ·KT (γB,γS)KT (γB,γB)−1J−1T ZT (γB)−1 is the invertible k× k matrix that depends
only on the discounts, the vector (1− FD(v)) ∈ Rk has the i-th component equal to 1− FD(vi), and
FD is the cumulative distribution function of the variable V .
Proof. Let us take the transformation wγB defined by wγB(A) := WT (γB)A (as in the proof of
Lemma 5) and v = wγB(A). Recall that, in this case, the j-th component of v is the intersection
point of the straight-line functions Saj and Saj−1 . It is evident that the strategic buyer chooses the
strategy aj , when his valuation v is in the segment [vj ; vj+1) for j ≥ 0 (to be formally correct, we
set v0 := 0, vk+1 := +∞). Thus, the expected strategic revenue equals to
E
[
SRevγS,γB(A, V )
]
=
k∑
j=1
(FD(vj+1)−FD(vj))(γS·p(aj ,A)) =
k∑
j=1
(FD(vj+1)−FD(vj))rj(γS,γB,A),
14In other words, the node nj can be represented in the string notation as ai1 . . . ait−1 for some 1 ≤ t ≤ T (see
Sec. 2.2).
15This fact is trivial for matrices ZT and JT . To show this for KT , just apply the induction. By rearranging of rows
and columns of KT (it does not affect the property of invertibility) one can obtain a block diagonal matrix with two
blocks. Each of these blocks is based on a matrix with the form like KT−1.
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see the definitions of p and r before Lemma 5. Let us denote by dF (v) the k-dimensional vector
with FD(vj+1)− FD(vj) in the j-th component, then, using the identity dF (v) = JᵀT (1− FD(v)),
we have
E
[
SRevγS,γB(A, V )
]
= dF (v)ᵀr(γS,γB,A) = (1− FD(v))ᵀJT r(γS,γB,A).
From the definition of the matrix KT , one can obtain r(γS,γB,A) = KT (γB,γS)A (as in the proof of
Lemma 5). Finally, we have A = WT (γB)−1v = KT (γB,γB)−1J−1T ZT (γB)−1v due to v = WT (γB)A
and invertibility of wγB .
So, let us combine all together:
E
[
SRevγS,γB(A, V )
]
= (1− FD(v))ᵀJT ·KT (γB,γS)KT (γB,γB)−1J−1T ZT (γB)−1v,
where the matrix product between (1− FD(v))ᵀ and v is exactly the matrix ΞT (γS,γB).
Corollary 2 and Proposition 4 immediately infer the following key result of our study.
Theorem 2. In a T -round game, let γS,γB be discounts s.t. ν(γB) ≤ ν(γS) and γB is a regular
one. The optimization problem of finding an optimal algorithm is equivalent to maximization of the
multivariate functional LD,γS,γB(·) over the set ∆k = {v ∈ Rk| 0 ≤ v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vk}, k = 2T − 1, i.e.,
max
A∈A
EV∼D
[
SRevγB,γS(A, V )
]
= max
v∈∆k
LD,γS,γB(v), (13)
where LD,γS,γB is defined in Eq. (12) and depends only on the discounts and the distribution D of
the valuation variable V .
It is quite important to emphasize that the k-dimensional functional LD,γS,γB is a bilinear form
applied to the vectors v and 1 − FD(v). This bilinear form is independent of the distribution D
and is defined by the matrix ΞT (γS,γB). In this view, we note that there is a strong relationship
between our optimization functional LD,γS,γB and the function HD (see Sec. 3). In other words, the
functional LD,γS,γB constitutes the key basis of optimal algorithms and is fundamental for them as
the function HD(p) = pPV∼D[V ≥ p] is fundamental for optimal pricing in static auctions.
Remark 5 (Th. 1 as a special case of Th. 2). Let us consider the case of equal discounts, γS = γB, then
KT (γ
B,γS) = KT (γ
B,γB) and the matrix ΞT (γS,γB) = JT ·KT (γB,γS)KT (γB,γB)−1J−1T ZT (γB)−1
becomes equal just to the diagonal matrix ZT (γB)−1 = diag(α1, . . . , αk), αj=γB · aj − γB · aj−1.
Hence,
LD,γB,γB(v) = (1− FD(v))ᵀZT (γB)−1v =
∑k
j=1(1− FD(vj))αjvj =
∑k
j=1HD(vj)αj .
Since αj > 0 (due to the dependence of the order of {aj}j on γB) and HD(v) ≤ HD(p∗(D)), ∀v,
(see Sec. 3) we infer that this sum above is maximal when v1 = . . . = vk = p∗(D). Thus, in the case
of equal discounts, the optimization of the functional LD,γB,γB reduces to the maximization of the
function HD used to find Myerson’s price p∗(D). This is expected and additionally highlights the
strong similarity of our optimization functional for the dynamic pricing to the one for the static
pricing.
So, in the particular case of equal discounts, the optimization of LD,γB,γB has no closed form
solution since it reduces to the optimization of HD. Hence, we expect that, in the other cases,
generally, our optimization problem does not admit a closed form solution as well. In the next
subsections, we numerically find the maximum of LD,γS,γB for several representative games and show
that the obtained optimal algorithms are no longer constant and significantly outperform the optimal
constant pricing in terms of the expected strategic revenue.
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Figure 1: 2-round game. The prices A∗(0),A∗(e),A∗(1) and the relative expected strategic revenue
(w.r.t. A∗D) of the optimal algorithm A∗ for discount rates: (a) γS = 0.8 and various γB; (b) γB = 0.2
and various γS.
Remark 6 (on regularity of γB). The regularity of the discount γB is used in two cases, namely, to
get: (1) the uniqueness of γ-dependent natural order of the strategies S; (2) zero probability of the
set of the valuations for which the optimal buyer strategy is not unique. The case (1) is used in
Lemma 5 and Prop. 4; there, regularity is just needed for simplicity of presentation of the proofs;
these statements (possibly with a slight change) will certainly hold without this restriction on γB.
The case (2) is used in Prop. 3 to guarantee that the strategic buyer will not prefer (with non-zero
probability) a strategy that has been non-active before the transformation. So, Prop. 3 may not
hold without regularity of γB. But we believe that one can obtain a similar result for a series of
algorithms that "converges" to a one from A˜ and use this series to obtain the statement of Th. 2. In
any way, the restriction on the regularity of γB does not harm the main conclusions of our work,
because, for a finite horizon, regular discounts are more frequent than non-regular ones, e.g., there is
just a finite number of non-regular geometric discounts for a finite horizon. Hence, our qualitative
results from Sec. 6.2 and 6.3 are not affected by this restriction.
6.2 Finite games: case study
In this subsection, based on several representative game settings, we demonstrate how to find optimal
algorithms using the functional LD,γS,γB and show the key properties of these algorithms. We consider
finite geometric discounts γB = {γt−1B I{t≤T}}∞t=1,γS = {γt−1S I{t≤T}}∞t=1 for 0 < γB < γS < 1 and the
valuation V uniformly16 distributed in [0, 1]. For 2- and 3-round games, according to Th. 2, we find
the optimal pricing algorithms by maximizing the functional LD,γS,γB from Eq. (12). Their expected
revenues are compared with the expected revenue HD(p∗(D))ΓS of the optimal constant pricing A∗D
(see Sec. 3), which is treated as the baseline from here on in this paper.
The case of T = 2. The maximum of the 3-variate functional LD,γS,γB can be found in the
hyperplane v2 = v3 (the proof is provided in Appendix A.7). Thus, for T = 2 the maximization
16During our experimentation, we also analyzed some other distributions. Since the results for them are found to be
similar to the ones for uniform, we present these results in Appendix C.
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Figure 2: 3-round game. The prices A∗(n), for nodes n ∈ N s.t. |n| ≤ 2, and relative expected
strategic revenue (w.r.t. A∗D) of the optimal algorithm A∗ for discounts: (a) γS = 0.8 and various γB;
(b) γB = 0.2 and various γS.
problem is reduced17 to a 2-variate optimization of the function L2 : ∆2 → R, where L2(v1, v2) =
(1− FD(v))ᵀΥ2(γS, γB)v, v ∈ ∆2, and Υ2(γS, γB) =
(
γS 0
−(γS − γB) 1 + γS − γB
)
.
Note that, for the uniform distribution D = U [0; 1], FD(v) = v and the optimized functional L2
becomes thus quadratic. Hence the problem can be solved by means of QP. We solve this problem
numerically using the Sequential Least Squares Programming method. So, for several pairs of (γS, γB),
we find the optimal algorithm A∗ and depict in Fig. 1 both its prices A∗(n) for all nodes n and its
relative expected strategic revenue (w.r.t. A∗D). Namely, Fig. 1(a) contains results for γS = 0.8 and
γB ∈ {0.01 + i · 0.005}148i=0, while Fig. 1(b) contains results for γB = 0.2 and γS ∈ {0.2 + i · 0.005}159i=0.
First, at the bottom of Fig. 1 we see that the optimal algorithm outperforms the baseline optimal
constant pricing for any observed pair of discounts. Second, the top part of Fig. 1 demonstrates us
that, for any pair of discounts, the optimal algorithm is a consistent pricing, i.e., the one which never
sets prices lower (higher) than earlier accepted (rejected, resp.) ones [15]. In fact, this property is
theoretically guaranteed for the studied case; namely, it easily follows from the relation between
the optimal prices and the optimum v: A∗(0) = v1, A∗(e) = γBv1 + (1 − γB)v2, and A∗(1) = v3.
Third, the obtained optimal algorithms are appeared to be continuous in γS and γB. Moreover, if
the distance between the discount rates γS and γB converges to 0, then the optimal algorithm A∗
converges to the optimal constant one A∗D (what experimentally supports Remark 5).
The case of T = 3. In a similar way as it done for the previous case, the dimensionality
of the optimization problem can be lowered from 7 to 4, when γB < (
√
5 − 1)/2, and to 5, when
γB > (
√
5− 1)/218. The method to solve the optimization problem and the set of (γS, γB) are the
same as in the case of T = 2. Fig. 2 is arranged similarly to Fig. 1.
Analogously to the case of T = 2, in Fig. 2, we observe the superiority of the optimal algorithm
A∗ over the baseline A∗D for any pair of discount rates, as well as convergence to A∗D as |γS− γB| → 0
and the continuity of A∗ in γS and γB. But, in contrast to the the case of T = 2, the optimal
17This case show that even though the dimension of the problem in right-hand side of Eq. (13) can be reduced, it
still could not be reduced to a one-dimensional problem in general. The same we observe in the case of T = 3.
18The different cases are results of the change of the order of the values {γB ·a|a ∈ S} at the border point (√5−1)/2.
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Figure 3: Infinite game. The prices A∗4(n), for nodes n ∈ N s.t. |n| ≤ 3, of the optimal 4-step
algorithm A∗4 and the relative expected strategic revenue (w.r.t. A∗D) of the optimal τ -step algorithm
A∗τ , τ = 2, .., 6, for discounts: (a) γS = 0.8 and various γB; (b) γB = 0.2 and various γS.
algorithm may be non-consistent : the condition of consistency is violated by the reverse order of the
prices A∗(e) < A∗(01) for γB > ≈ 0.54 (which seen in Fig. 2(a)), i.e., the seller offers a price larger
than the one at the first round if the buyer rejects the first price, but accepts the one at the second
round.
There is a lot of other interesting observations: e.g., pairs of equal prices when γB → 0 (see Fig. 1
and 2); some specific area of pairs of (γS, γB) where algorithm prices becomes equal (see Fig. 2), etc.
They are seen further in Fig. 3 as well, and a thorough study of them is deferred to future work.
6.3 Infinite game: approximately optimal algorithms and case study
Let us return to the case of the infinite game with ν(γB) < ν(γS). In this case, we have no powerful
instrument to find an optimal pricing (unlike to the case of finite games). However, one can approxi-
mate the optimal algorithm by an optimal one in some finite dimensional subclass of A. Namely, for
τ ∈ N, let us say that A is a τ -step pricing algorithm, if ∀a, t > τ : A(a1:t−1) = A(a1:τ−1), i.e., at
rounds t > τ , it offers the price equal to the one that has been offered at the round τ . The set of all
τ -step algorithms is denoted by Aτ and we refer to any A ∈ Aτ as a finite algorithm as well.
An attentive reader may note that the problem of finding the optimal τ -step algorithm for the
infinite game is equivalent to finding the optimal algorithm in the τ -round game with the finite
discounts γ˜S and γ˜B, where the operator γ˜ means: γ˜t := γt, t < τ ; γ˜τ :=
∑∞
t=τ γt; and γ˜t := 0, t > τ .
The condition ν(γB) < ν(γS) implies ν(γ˜B) < ν(γ˜S) (see Remark 4). Hence, one can apply the
optimization technique from Theorem 2. The following proposition (the proof is presented in
Appendix A.8) formally states that the expected strategic revenue of the optimal τ -step algorithm
A∗τ converges to one of the optimal pricing A∗ when τ →∞.
Proposition 5. let γS, γB be discounts s.t. ν(γB) ≤ ν(γS) and ΓSτ :=
∑∞
t=τ+1 γ
S
t for τ ∈ N. Then
the following bounds hold:
max
A∈Aτ
E
[
SRevγS,γB(A, V )
] ≤ max
A∈A
E
[
SRevγS,γB(A, V )
] ≤ max
A∈Aτ
E
[
SRevγS,γB(A, V )
]
+ ΓSτE [V ] .
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Finally, let us consider geometric discounts γB = {γt−1B }∞t=1,γS = {γt−1S }∞t=1 for 0 < γB < γS < 1
and the valuation V uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. Following the procedure described in Sec. 6.2,
we numerically find optimal τ -step algorithm A∗τ , τ = 2, .., 6, for the same set of pairs (γS, γB) as
in the case of T = 2 in Sec. 6.2. The obtained in this way prices of A∗4 and the relative expected
revenue of A∗τ , τ = 2, .., 6 are arranged in Fig. 3 similarly to Fig. 1. We see that the expected
strategic revenue of A∗τ converges quite quickly to the optimal one. This observation constitutes the
empirical evidence of Prop. 5, which suggests that the convergence rate is equal to γS. We also can
note the observations similar to the ones made for the optimal algorithms in Sec. 6.2. In particular,
we see that in the case of the infinite game, the baseline optimal constant algorithm is significantly
outperformed by algorithms with noticeably non-static pricing as well.
7 Conclusions
We studied online learning algorithms that maximize expected cumulative revenue of repeated
posted-price auctions in the scenario with a strategic buyer that holds a fixed private valuation.
More precisely, we investigated the situation in which the seller ant the buyer may have different
level of the patience to wait for utility, and which is modeled via own discounts in the cumulative
utilities for the buyer and the seller. Surprisingly, we found that only in the case of equal discounts,
the seller cannot advantageously use the ability to change prices in dynamic fashion (i.e., to learn
them) with respect to the static approach. Namely, the case of equal discounts admits two optimal
algorithms; one of them constantly offers the Myerson price, while the other one proposes a “big
deal": pay for all goods in advance (at the first round) or get nothing. But, first, in the case of more
patient buyer, the pricing algorithm “big deal" was shown to outperform the constant pricing.
Second, in the inverse case when the seller’s discount rate is larger than the one of the buyer, we
reduced the problem of finding an optimal algorithm to a multidimensional optimization problem
with a multivariate analogue of the functional used to determine Myerson’s price. Our reduction
does not admit a closed form solution in general (similarly, to the case of revenue optimal static
auctions), but can be solved by state-of-the-art numerical optimization techniques (like gradient
ones). We conducted extensive analysis of numerically found optimal algorithms to demonstrate
that they are non-trivial, may be non-consistent, and generate larger expected revenue than the
constant pricing with the Myerson price. Overall, this work provided clear techniques for obtaining
guarantees on the seller’s revenue in repeated posted-price auctions that may help in future studies
on a more sophisticated scenarios and auction mechanisms.
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A Missing proofs
A.1 Existence of an optimal strategy a ∈ S (from Section 2.1)
Assume we are given an algorithm A ∈ A, a correct discount sequence γ = {γt}∞t=1 and a private
valuation v ∈ [0; +∞) (they are fixed). In this case, for the function F : S→ R∪{−∞}, F (a) = Sa(v)
the following proposition holds.
Proposition 6. There exists a strategy a∗ ∈ S such that ∀a ∈ S : F (a∗) ≥ F (a).
Proof of Proposition 6. Denote M = supa∈S Sa(v) and S0 = S. Let k ≥ 0 be a non-negative
integer, then assume that a∗1, . . . , a∗k ∈ {0, 1} and Sk = {a = {at}∞t=1 ∈ S| a1 . . . ak = a∗1 . . . a∗k} such
that supa∈Sk Sa(v) = M defined (if such conditions holds we call the tuple (a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
k,Sk) correct).
We define such a∗k+1 that the tuple (a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
k, a
∗
k+1,Sk+1) is correct.
{a = {at}∞t=1 ∈ S| a1 . . . akak+1 = a∗1 . . . a∗k0} and {a = {at}∞t=1 ∈ S| a1 . . . akak+1 = a∗1 . . . a∗k1}
are denoted by S0k and S
1
k respectively, similarly supa∈S0k Sa(v) and supa∈S1k Sa(v) are denoted by
M0 and M1. Since Sk = S0k ∪S1k, the following identity holds M = max{M0,M1}. If M = M0
we define a∗k+1 = 0 and Sk+1 = S
0
k, otherwise a
∗
k+1 = 1 and Sk+1 = S
1
k. Thus, by the definition of
a∗k+1 and Sk+1 the tuple (a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
k, a
∗
k+1,Sk+1) is correct.
Taking into account that for k = 0 the tuple (S0) is correct, we obtain uniquely defined sequence
a∗ = {a∗t }∞t=1 such that for all integer k ≥ 0 the tuple (a∗1, . . . , a∗k,Sk) for Sk = {a = {at}∞t=1 ∈
S| a1 . . . ak = a∗1 . . . a∗k} is correct.
Before finally proving Proposition 1 we prove an auxillary statement:
∀T ∈ N
∑
t≥T
γta
∗
t (v − pt) ≥ 0,
where {pt}∞t=1 is the sequence of prices set by the algorithm A in response to a∗. Indeed, for an
arbitrary T ∈ N assume ∑t≥T γta∗t (v − pt) = −δ < 0. In this case, since the series ∑t≥T γt and∑
t≥T γta
∗
t (v−pt) converge, there exists such integer T0 ≥ T that
∑
t≥T0 γtv <
δ
3 and
∑
t≥T0 γta
∗
t (v−
pt) > − δ2 , which impllies∑
T0≥t≥T
γta
∗
t (v − pt) =
∑
t≥T
γta
∗
t (v − pt)−
∑
t>T0
γta
∗
t (v − pt) < −δ +
δ
2
= −δ
2
Thus, for an arbitrary strategy a ∈ ST0 (denote prices corresponding to a by qt : ∀t ≤ T0+1 : qt = pt)
we gain for b = a∗1 . . . a∗T0
∞
Sa(v) =
∑
t≤T
γta
∗
t (v − pt) +
∑
T<t≤T0
γta
∗
t (v − pt) +
∑
T0<t
γtat(v − qt) < Sb(v)− δ
2
+
δ
3
< M − δ
6
,
which implies supa∈ST0−1 Sa(v) ≤ M −
δ
6 < M . This contradicts to the correctness of the tuple
(a∗1, . . . , a∗T0−1,ST0−1).
Now assume ∀a ∈ S Sa(v) < M , hence, Sa∗(v) < M and there exists such strategy a ∈ S that
M > Sa(v) > Sa∗(v) by the definition of M . Define ε = Sa(v)− Sa∗(v). Consider an integer T1 ≥ 0
such that
∑
t>T1
γtv < ε (T1 exists, since the series
∑∞
t=1 γt converges). By the definition of a
∗ and
ST1 there exists such strategy b = {bt}∞t=1 ∈ ST1 that Sb(v) > Sa(v) (and b1 . . . bT1 = a∗1 . . . a∗T1).
Hence, denoting the price sequence set by A in response to b by {p1t }∞t=1 (p11 . . . p1T1+1 = p1 . . . pT1+1)
and using that
∑
t>T1
γta
∗
t (v − pt) ≥ 0 we gain
ε < Sb(v)− Sa∗(v) =
∑
t>T1
γtbt(v − p1t )−
∑
t>T1
γta
∗
t (v − pt) < ε− 0 = ε,
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which is the contradiction. Thus, the desired result ∃a ∈ S Sa(v) = M is obtained.
A.2 Existence of a global maximum point of HD(v) (from Section 3)
Assume the non-negative random variable V ∼ D has a finite expectation, and the distribution
function G(v) = PV∼D[v < V ] is continuous.
Proposition 7. In this case, the function HD(v) = G(v) · v has a global maxima point.
Proof of Proposition 7. We denote the probability measure function by µV : B(R)→ [0; 1], µV (A) =
P[V ∈ A], since we already use P in traditional manner (e.g. P[V ≥ 0]). Here B(R) is the Borel
Algebra for R with the standard topology set. In this terms, the function HD can be expressed as
follows
HD(v¯) = G(v¯) · v¯ = P[V > v¯] · v¯ = v¯ ·
∫
(v¯;+∞)
1dµV ,
which can be upper bound by
∫
(v¯;+∞) vdµV , where
∫
A f(v)dµV denotes the Lebegue’s integral of
a function f on a set A w.r.t. the probability measure µV . Due to the absolute continuity of the
Lebesgue integral (see Appendix B.1), the fact that µV ((v¯; +∞)) −−−→
v¯→∞ 0 holds, and, since V has a
finite expectation, we obtain that
∫
(v¯;+∞) vdµV −−−→v¯→∞ 0 and, thus,
HD(v¯) ≤
∫
(v¯;+∞)
vdµV −−−→
v¯→∞ 0⇒ HD(v¯) −−−→v¯→∞ 0.
Hence, for an arbitrary picked point v0 > 0 such that HD(v0) > 0 there exists such v1 > v0 that
∀v > v1 HD(v) < HD(v0), thus, if HD has a maxima point v∗ in the segment [0; v1], then v∗ is the
global maxima point, but HD is a continuous function, hence, it has a maxima point in any segment,
thus, Proposition 2 is proved.
A.3 Proof of the claims in Lemma 1 (from Section 4)
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof of that R(v) is increasing is provided in the main text in Section 4.
Proof of R(0) = 0.
Now we also note that ∀v ≥ 0 R(v) ≥ 0, since R(v) = ∑∞t=1 γtatpt (as a sum of non-negative
terms). By the definition S(0) = −R(0) and, thus, R(0) = −S(0) ≤ 0. Therefore, R(0) = 0.
Proof of 0 ≤ E [R(V )] < +∞.
Now consider v ≥ 0 and let a = {at}∞t=1 be the optimal strategy for v. Hence,
0 ≤ S(v) =
∞∑
t=1
γtat(v − pt) ≤ Γv −R(v)⇒ R(v) ≤ Γv
Thus,
∀v ≥ 0 : 0 ≤ R(v) ≤ Γv ⇒ 0 ≤ E [R(V )] ≤ Γ · E [V ]
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A.4 Proof of Lemma 2 (from Section 4)
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider an arbitrary optimal strategy a for the valuation v, i.e., s.t. S(v) =
Sa(v). Since Sa(w) = qaw− ra for any w ≥ 0 and Sa(v) = S(v), we can write Sa(v+ δ) = S(v) + qaδ
and by the definition of the derivative S(v+δ) = S(v)+S′(v)δ+oδ→0(δ), thus Sa(v+δ)−S(v+δ) =
(qa − S′(v))δ + oδ→0(δ), which should be not greater than zero for all possible δ since S is convex.
Hence we get qa = S′, because otherwise (qa−S′(v))δ+ oδ→0(δ) will take both positive and negative
values in a neighborhood of 0. Finally, remind that Q(v) = qa since a is optimal for v.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 3 (from Section 4.1)
Proof of Lemma 3. First we note, that due to the absolute continuity of the Lebesgue integral (see
B.1) and the fact that R(V ) has a finite expectation we can write E
[
R(V )I[0;v¯](V )
] −−−−→
v¯→+∞ E [R(V )].
Rewrite E
[
R(V )I[0;v¯](V )
]
using Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral w.r.t. the fact that F (v) = 1−G(v):
E
[
R(V )I[0;v¯](V )
]
=
∫
[0;v¯]
R(v)dF (v) = −
∫
[0;v¯]
R(v)dG(v) (A.1)
For the latter integral we use the integration by parts formula (which holds since G is continuous on
it’s domain and R is non-decreasing on it’s domain) and gain
−
∫
[0;v¯]
R(v)dG(v) = −G(v)R(v)
∣∣∣v¯
0
+
∫
[0;v¯]
G(v)dR(v) = (A.2)
−G(v)R(v)
∣∣∣v¯
0
+
∫
[0;v¯]
G(v)d(Q(v) · v)−
∫
[0;v¯]
G(v)dS(v) (A.3)
Since the function G is continuous on [0; v¯], the Riemann-Stieltjes integral
v¯∫
0
G(v)d(Q(v) · v)
is defined and equals to the corresponding Lebesgues-Stieltjes integral. For the Riemann-Stieltjes
integral for our conditions following identity holds
v¯∫
0
G(v)d(Q(v) · v) =
v¯∫
0
G(v)Q(v)dv +
v¯∫
0
G(v) · vdQ(v). (A.4)
Bringing together that R(0) = 0 (Lemma 1) and lim
v¯→+∞R(v¯)G(v¯) = 0 (because
R(v¯)G(v¯) ≤
∫
(v¯;+∞)
R(v)dF (v) −−−−→
v¯→+∞ 0,
which holds due to the absolute continuity of the Lebesgue integral), Eq. (A.1), Eq. (A.2) and
Eq. (A.4) (and taking the limits) we get
E [R(V )] = lim
v¯→+∞E
[
R(V )I[0;v¯](V )
]
=
+∞∫
0
G(v)Q(v)dv +
+∞∫
0
G(v)vdQ(v)−
∫
[0;+∞)
G(v)dS(v).
Considering first two integrals in the latter expression as Lebesgue and Lebesgue-Stieltjes integrals
respectively, we obtain the desired result
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A.6 Proof of wγ(A) ∈ ∆k(T ) ⇔ A ∈ A˜(γ) from Lemma 5 (from Section 6.1)
The proof of the statement that wγ(A) ∈ ∆k(T ) if and only if A ∈ A˜(γ) could be made via two
following inductions.
• Let A ∈ A˜(γ) and v = wγ(A). Then, for j = 1, . . . , k, vj ≥ 0 (the basis of the induction).
Indeed, assume that this condition is violated for some j, then Saj−1(v) < Saj (v) ∀v > vj , but
vj < 0, and, thus aj−1 is not active, which is a contradiction. So, let us set v0 := 0 (for the
notation simplicity); assume, for s ≥ 0, 0 ≤ v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vs and vs ≤ vs+1, . . . , vk; and prove
that vs+1 ≤ vs+2, . . . , vk (the inductive step).
Assume the contrary: for some j > s+1 we have vs ≤ vj < vs+1. Then Sas(vj) > Sas+1(vj) since
Sas(vs+1) = Sas+1(vs+1) and the slope of Sas is less than that of Sas+1 . If Saj (vj) ≥ Sas(vj),
we have Sas+1(v) < Saj−1(v) for v > vj and Sas+1(v) < Sas(v) for v ≤ vj , which means that
as+1 is not active. Otherwise, we have Saj−1(v) < Sas(v) for v ≤ vj and Saj−1(v) < Saj (v)
for v > vj , which means that aj−1 is not active. Both cases infer contradiction, thus, the
induction holds.
• Conversely, let v = wγ(A) ∈ ∆k(T ). Then Saj (0) ≤ Saj−1(0) for all j > 0 (and, thus, Sa0 is
active). Indeed, assume that this condition is violated for some j, then vj < 0, contradiction
(the basis of the induction). So, let us set v0 := 0 (for the notation simplicity); assume, for
s ≥ 0, that
Saj , j ≤ s, are active , Saj (vs) ≤ Saj−1(vs) for j > s and Saj (vs) ≤ Sas(vs) for j < s;
and prove that
Sas+1 is active, Saj (vs+1) ≤ Saj−1(vs+1)forj > s+1 and Saj (vs+1) ≤ Sas+1(vs+1)forj < s+1;
i.e., (the inductive step).
The second condition is due to vj ≥ vs+1 for j > s + 1. The third condition for j = s
follows from the definition of vs+1 and the same for j < s is due to the fact that Saj (vs+1) ≤
Sas(vs+1)(= Sas+1(vs+1)), since the slope of the function Saj is less than the slope of the
function Sas and Saj (vs) ≤ Sas(vs). The second condition together with the third conditions
gives the activeness of Sas+1 . Thus, the induction holds.
A.7 The dimension reduction in the case of finite game with horizon T = 2
Let γB = {γt−1b · I{t≤2}}∞t=1 and γS = {γt−1s · I{t≤2}}∞t=1 for 0 < γb < γs < 1. Build the ΞT (γB,γS)
matrix by the definition:
ΞT (γ
B,γS) =
 γs 0 0−(γs − γb) 1− γb 0
0 0 γs

Now we prove that L(v) = (1−F (v))ᵀΞT (γB,γS)v always has a maximum on the hyperplane v2 = v3.
Indeed, assume it’s not and consider a maximum point with coordinates v1, v2, v3 such that
v2 < v3. Consider two possible cases: (1−F (v3))v3 > (1−F (v2))v2 and (1−F (v3))v3 ≤ (1−F (v2))v2.
• (1− F (v3))v3 > (1− F (v2))v2 implies L(v1, v2, v3) < L(v1, v3, v3), since
L(v1, v3, v3)−L(v1, v2, v3) = −(γs−γb)(F (v2)−F (v3))v1+(1−γb)((1−F (v3))v3−(1−F (v2))v2),
where the left term is non-negative, since v3 > v2, and the right term is strictly positive by the
assumption. L(v1, v2, v3) < L(v1, v3, v3) contradicts to our assumption.
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• (1− F (v3))v3 ≤ (1− F (v2))v2 implies L(v1, v2, v3) ≤ L(v1, v2, v2), since
L(v1, v2, v2)− L(v1, v2, v3) = γs((1− F (v2))v2 − (1− F (v3))v3) ≥ 0.
This also contradicts to our assumption.
Both possible cases infer contradiction, thus, our assumption is wrong. Q.E.D.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 5 (from Section 6.3)
Proof of Proposition 5. The left inequality is trivial, since Aτ ⊂ A. The second obvious observation
is that SRevγS,γB(A, v) for A ∈ Aτ is equal to SRevγS,γ˜B(A, v), where γ˜S = {γ˜t}∞t=1 is equal to γS
on [1; τ − 1], γ˜τ =
∑∞
t=τ γ
S
t and γ˜t = 0 for t > τ . For such sellers discount γ˜
S the strategic revenue
is obviously does not depend on algorithm prices for rounds τ + 1, τ + 2, . . . , thus,
max
A∈Aτ
E
[
SRevγS,γB(A, V )
]
= max
A∈A
E
[
SRevγS,γ˜B(A, V )
]
.
The following step of the proof is formulated as a lemma:
Lemma 6. Let γS,γS,1,γS,2 be discounts such that γS = γS,1 + γS,2. In this case
max
A∈A
E
[
SRevγS,γB(A, V )
] ≤ max
A∈A
E
[
SRevγS,1,γB(A, V )
]
+ max
A∈A
E
[
SRevγS,2,γB(A, V )
]
We omit the proof, since it is trivial. Apply Lemma 6 to the sellers discount divided into two
parts as follows: γS = γS · I{t>τ} + γS · I{t≤τ}:
max
A∈A
E
[
SRevγS,γB(A, V )
] ≤ max
A∈A
E
[
SRevγS·I{t≤τ},γB(A, V )
]
+ max
A∈A
E
[
SRevγS·I{t>τ},γB(A, V )
]
The left term of the right-hand side of the inequality is not greater than maxA∈A E
[
SRevγS,γ˜B(A, V )
]
,
since γ˜S ≥ γS · I{t≤τ} and the right term is not greater than ΓSτE [V ]. This fact can be proved in
following several steps:
1. Following identitiy can be verifyed by the direct application of ν(γ) definition:
γSτ+i = γ
B
τ+i ·
ν(γS)τ+i−1
ν(γB)τ+i−1
· · · · · ν(γ
S)τ+1
ν(γB)τ+1
· γ
S
τ
γBτ
2. Define ci :=
ν(γS)τ+i−1
ν(γB)τ+i−1 · · · · ·
ν(γS)τ+1
ν(γB)τ+1
· γSτγBτ for i ≥ 1, thus, ci are increasing and
γSτ+i = ci · γBτ+i
3. In this case
γS · I{t>τ} = c1γB · I{t>τ} + (c2 − c1)γB · I{t>τ+1} + (c3 − c2)γB · I{t>τ+2}
4. Consider a case when the discount of the seller is c · γB · I{t>τ+i} for some c > 0. Let A ∈ A
and a = {at}∞t=1 be some optimal strategy for a valuation v > 0. Then
S(v) =
∞∑
t=1
atγ
B
t (v−A(a1:t−1)) ≥
τ+i∑
t=1
atγ
B
t (v−A(a1:t−1))⇒
∞∑
t=τ+i+1
atγ
B
t v ≥
∞∑
t=τ+i+1
atγ
B
tA(a1:t−1)
But the right part of the last inequality is 1cSRevcγB·I{t>τ+i},γB(A, v), and, thus,
cΓBτ+iv ≥ SRevcγB·I{t>τ+i},γB(A, v)⇒ cΓBτ+iE [V ] ≥ maxA∈A E
[
SRevcγB·I{t>τ+i},γB(A, V )
]
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5. Finally, apply Lemma 6 and the identity from our third step and get (for the notation simplicity
c0 := 0):
max
A∈A
E
[
SRevγS·I{t>τ},γB(A, V )
]
≤
∞∑
i=1
(ci − ci−1)ΓBτ+i−1E [V ] = ΓSτE [V ] Q.E.D.
B Auxiliary definitions and propositions
B.1 Absolute continuity of the Lebesgue integral ([27])
Proposition 8. Consider the Lebesgue measure µ on R and let f : R→ R be an integrable function
on A ⊂ R, then for any ε > 0 there exists such δ > 0 that∣∣∣∣∫
B
f(x)dµ
∣∣∣∣ < ε,
where B ⊂ A : µ(B) < δ.
C Numerical Solutions for different distributions
Here we provide plots for V ∼ β(4, 2), V ∼ β(2, 4), and V distributed with the density 1−e−x
1−e−1 I0≤x≤1
in different special cases. Discount are taken identically to those from Section 6.2 and Section 6.3
(as well as grids for γB and γS). Figures descriptions are given in the following list:
1. Figure C.1: 2-round game for V ∼ β(4, 2).
2. Figure C.2: 2-round game for V ∼ β(2, 4).
3. Figure C.3: 3-round game for V ∼ β(4, 2).
4. Figure C.4: 3-round game for V ∼ β(2, 4).
5. Figure C.5: infinite game for V distributed with the density 1−e
−x
1−e−1 I0≤x≤1, which is a density
of a random variable ξ ∼ Exp(1) conditioned by 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1.
D The analog of the Envelope theorem
Here we show how one can use the abstract method to obtain results in case γS ≤ γB. First of all let
us introduce the generalization of the envelope theorem:
Theorem 3. Let V = I1×· · ·×I|A|, where Ij is an interval or a segment.19 Let p, ω : Vi → R,R|A|20
such that
1.
∑|A|
i=1 ωi(v) = 1 for all v ∈ V .
19Think of V as a type of a buyer: if the set of alternatives in a game is A, then for each alternative i-th buyer has
a valuation vi, the vector (v1, . . . , v|A|) is the type of the buyer.
20ω corresponds to the distribution of alternatives, p corresponds to the payment.
26
0.425
0.450
0.475
0.500
0.525
0.550
0.575
(b) gamma_b = 0.2
A(0) A() A(1)
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
Op
tim
al
 a
lg
or
ith
m
 p
ric
es
(a) gamma_s = 0.8
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
gamma_s
1.00
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
gamma_b
1.00
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08
Re
la
tiv
e 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 st
ra
te
gi
c 
re
ve
nu
e
Optimal
Baseline
Figure C.1: 2-round game. The prices A∗(0),A∗(e),A∗(1) and the relative expected strategic revenue
(w.r.t. A∗D) of the optimal algorithm A∗ for discount rates: (a) γS = 0.8 and various γB; (b) γB = 0.2
and various γS.
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Figure C.2: 2-round game. The prices A∗(0),A∗(e),A∗(1) and the relative expected strategic revenue
(w.r.t. A∗D) of the optimal algorithm A∗ for discount rates: (a) γS = 0.8 and various γB; (b) γB = 0.2
and various γS.
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Figure C.3: 3-round game. The prices A∗(n), for nodes n ∈ N s.t. |n| ≤ 2, and relative expected
strategic revenue (w.r.t. A∗D) of the optimal algorithm A∗ for discounts: (a) γS = 0.8 and various γB;
(b) γB = 0.2 and various γS.
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Figure C.4: 3-round game. The prices A∗(n), for nodes n ∈ N s.t. |n| ≤ 2, and relative expected
strategic revenue (w.r.t. A∗D) of the optimal algorithm A∗ for discounts: (a) γS = 0.8 and various γB;
(b) γB = 0.2 and various γS.
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Figure C.5: Infinite game. The prices A∗4(n), for nodes n ∈ N s.t. |n| ≤ 3, of the optimal 4-step
algorithm A∗4 and the relative expected strategic revenue (w.r.t. A∗D) of the optimal τ -step algorithm
A∗τ , τ = 2, .., 6, for discounts: (a) γS = 0.8 and various γB; (b) γB = 0.2 and various γS.
2. ∀v0, v1 v0 · ω(v0)− p(v0) ≥ v0 · ω(v1)− p(v1) (where a · b is for a scalar product).21
Then following statements about ω and p are true:
1. U(v) := v · ω(v)− p(v) is convex, ωi, p are increasing in vi for all i.
2. The differential dU(v) is defined almost everywhere and equals to ω(v).
Proof. First let us prove the convexity of U . Consider v0, v1 ∈ V . Denote va = (1− a)v0 + av1 for
a ∈ [0; 1]. Then
U(va) = va · ω(va)− p(va) = (1− a)(v0 · ω(va)− p(va)) + a(v1 · ω(va)− p(va)) ≤
≤ (1− a)(v0 · ω(v0)− p(v0)) + a(v1 · ω(v1)− p(v1)) = (1− a)U(v0) + aU(v1),
thus, by the definition U is convex.
Consider v = (vi, v−i) and v′ = (v′i, v−i) for v
′
i > vi. Then by the second property
viωi(v)− p(v) ≥ viωi(v′)− p(v′)
v′iωi(v
′)− p(v′) ≥ v′iωi(v)− p(v)
Rearranging these inequalities we get
v′i(ωi(v)− ωi(v′)) ≤ p(v)− p(v′) ≤ vi(ωi(v)− ωi(v′)),
which can be satisfied only if ωi(v)−ωi(v′) ≤ 0, since v′i > vi. Thus, ωi(v) ≤ ωi(v′) and p(v) ≤ p(v′),
i.e. ωi, p are increasing in vi for all i, since i, v−i, vi < v′i were chosen arbitrarily.
Finally let v ∈ V and δv be the increment, in this case by the second property
δv · ω(v) ≤ U(v + δv)− U(v) ≥ δv · ω(v + δv),
which infers that dU(v) equals to ω(v), if ω is continuous in v, which is almost everywhere. Q.E.D.
21This property means that the optimal buyers strategy is to tell true about his type in the mechanism (p, ω).
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